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TIME, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE
COMMON LAW
INTRODUCTION
THOMAS W. MERRILL*
The fee simple is often defined as an estate or interest of "potentially
infinite duration." This way of speaking suggests that property rights are
fixed and permanent-indeed, that they last forever. Similarly, property
rights are regarded in classical liberal thought as sources of stability and
security that foster individual autonomy and protect owners against the
vicissitudes of life. This too suggests that property rights are not contingent upon a particular temporal context, but rather are impervious to the
passage of time.
When we look at the common law, however, we quickly discover a
much more complex relationship between property rights and time.
Property rights do not extend infinitely backward in time. Rather, they
originate at some determinant point in the past, typically with a grant
from the sovereign, but occasionally also with acts of first possession.
Further, property rights can be lost through the passage of time. If property comes into the possession of someone other than the owner, and the
owner sits on his rights, then, by operation of the doctrines of adverse
possession and prescription, ownership may pass to the possessor. Finally, property rights cannot be projected indefinitely forward in time.
The power of an owner to tie up his property in the future is restricted by
various rules and doctrines, such as the rule against perpetuities, the prohibition on restraints of alienation, statutes forbidding the creation of a
* General editor. Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
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fee tail, marketable title acts that limit the duration of defeasible fees, and
the changed circumstances doctrine in the law of servitudes.
A Conference on "Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law,"
sponsored by the Liberty Fund, Inc. and administered by the Law and
Economics Center of George Mason University, was held at Point Clear,
Alabama on November 14-17, 1985. The papers delivered at the Conference, and an edited transcript of the proceedings, are reproduced here.
The principal paper, by Professor Richard Epstein of the University of
Chicago Law School, ties together in a single unified framework the various ways in which time and property interact. There follow four critical
commentaries, by Professors Robert C. Ellickson of Stanford Law
School, Margaret J. Radin of the University of Southern California Law
School, Charles K. Rowley of the Public Choice Center at George Mason University, and David D. Haddock of the Economics Department at
Emory University. These four authors take issue with Epstein's method
and with at least some of his conclusions. Finally, in the round table
discussion that concludes the conference, Professor Epstein responds to
his critics, and the five authors join forces with other leading academics
in a spirited exchange of views about the legal, philosophical, and economic implications of the temporal element in the common law of
property.
Professor Epstein divides his analysis into two broad categories:
problems that arise because of events that occurred in the past, and
problems that arise because of what might happen in the future. Looking
backward, Epstein argues that the root of property rights should be first
possession. First possession, he says, gets valuable resources in the hands
of private owners quickly and efficiently and avoids the might-makesright implications that follow if we posit that property rights originate in
grants from the sovereign. Somewhat paradoxically, however, Epstein
also endorses adverse possession-a doctrine that allows the claims of the
first possessor to be defeated by a later possessor. In an ideal world of
corrective justice, Epstein believes, we would not permit the involuntary
transfer of property rights. But where property has been transferred by
nonconsensual means, and a significant period of time has passed without
the true owner asserting his rights, rectification becomes ever more
costly. At some point, Epstein argues, the error costs of seeking to maintain an ideal system of corrective justice become too great and justify a
transfer of ownership to the possessor.
Looking forward, Epstein adopts a much more uncompromising stand
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in favor of unrestrained ownership rights. He first considers and defends
the potentially infinite duration of the fee simple. Any temporally-limited system of rights, he argues, would run into insuperable problems
over how to allocate the rights to the remainder and how to avoid distorted incentives on the part of the primary owner. More controversially, Epstein would give the owner of this potentially infinite right
complete freedom to determine its use and ownership in the future.
Thus, he would strike down all doctrines, such as the rule against perpetuities, that limit the power of an owner to dictate who shall hold property or how it shall be used in future generations. In support of this
position, Epstein argues that a rational property owner will always seek
to maximize the present value of his property, whether it be in his own
hands or in the hands of a donee or heir. Thus, the rational owner will
not tie up his property in ways that would reduce its value; rather, he will
create a trust or other governance structure that will permit the identity
of specific assets to change over time while maintaining the purpose of
the original gift. Consequently, Epstein concludes, when we look to the
future there is no need to depart from a system of pure corrective justice,
as is the case with adverse possession when we look to the past.
The four commentaries tackle Epstein's paper at two different levels.
At one level, they question Epstein's attempt to mix libertarian and utilitarian arguments. Professor Ellickson sees Epstein as a libertarian who
inconsistently opts for a utilitarian defense of adverse possession. Ellickson argues that Epstein would be better off applying a utilitarian analysis
to all of the issues he discusses. Similarly, Professor Radin finds that
Epstein asserts an equivalence between Lockean entitlement theory and
utilitarianism, when in fact they are in considerable tension and would
often lead to different results. She also notes Epstein's disregard of personality theory, another philosophical tradition that has still different implications for time and property rights. Professor Rowley is likewise
unpersuaded by Epstein's blend of libertarianism and utilitarianism.
Rowley, however, finds that Epstein's argument is primarily utilitarian,
in the wealth-maximization tradition of the Chicago School of law and
economics. He criticizes this orientation from the perspective of the Virginia School of political economy, which he contends is more sensitive to
the problematic nature of transaction-cost arguments and less inclined to
assume that the decision maker (the state, the judiciary, or whatever) will
apply an efficiency criterion, as opposed to some self-serving or interestgroup perspective, in setting governing rules.
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At a second level, the commentaries challenge several of Epstein's specific arguments. Professor Haddock takes a critical look at Epstein's endorsement of the rules of first possession. Building on work that
addresses the optimal system of property rights in innovations, such as
patent rights, Haddock argues that where the nature and scope of property rights are clear before they are discovered-as is generally the case
with land and other conventional property rights-a system of "mightiest possession" is more efficient than a system of first possession. Professor Ellickson takes a detailed look at Epstein's treatment of adverse
possession, and offers an analysis of the optimal length of the statute of
limitations that differs in several respects from Epstein's analysis. Finally, Professor Radin challenges Epstein's conclusion that there should
be no legal restrictions on the power of property owners to tie up their
property into the indefinite future. She argues that it may be necessary to
restrict the freedom to bind future generations in order to insure that the
owners of tomorrow have the same degree of freedom as the owners of
today.
In the round table discussion that follows the papers, the reader will
find many vigorous exchanges between Professor Epstein and his critics
on virtually every point raised by the principal paper and the commentaries. In addition, the discussion explores a number of topics in greater
depth than do the papers. Some of the issues considered include: Is libertarianism a unitary concept, or are there several strands of libertarian
thought which are in varying degrees of tension with utilitarianism?
What is the status of aboriginal claims under a regime of first possession?
Can adverse possession and the length of the statute of limitations be
analyzed in terms of a Calabresian cheapest-cost-avoider analysis? How
should the legal system handle the problem of good faith as opposed to
bad faith adverse possession? What accounts for the variations we see
from one state to another in the length of the statute of limitations?
Should government-owned land be subject to the same adverse possession rules as privately owned land? Why, given the advantage of the
potentially infinite fee simple, do we commonly see property conveyed by
ninety-nine-year leases? Should a property owner have the power to destroy his own property, and if so, does this necessarily entail the power to
make it unmarketable in the future? Is it correct to posit that property
owners will act to maximize the present value of their property when
they give it to someone else, or are there significant problems of incapacity, irrationality or anti-market preferences that require state interven-
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tion here? Does the emergence of condominium and cooperative
associations suggest an analogy to the formation of political constitutions? If so, does the fact that political constitutions are always amendable suggest that privately imposed restraints on the future use of property
should also be amendable by some collectively determined process?
These questions are fascinating, and the Conference proceedings
should be of interest to a wide audience of academics, including not just
specialists in the field of property law but also those interested in legal
and economic theory more generally. In addition, first-year property
teachers will find a vertiable treasure trove of material here that can enrich and enliven the traditional property course. Finally, law students
should find the papers and the discussion an excellent vehicle for review,
as well as a stimulus to further thought and study.

